Behind Diplomatic Lines_Relations with Ministers Read online

  23 OCTOBER 1986

  The Hindawi jury failed to reach a decision today, but will presumably do so tomorrow. Geoffrey Howe was recorded in a letter from No. 10 as having ‘agreed totally’ with the decision to break relations, which is strange; but presumably he decided that if he was not going to try to reverse the decision, he had no other option.

  24 OCTOBER 1986

  Sherard interrupted my talks with the Austrians by passing me a note at noon, to say that Hindawi had been found guilty, and sentenced to forty-five years. The Syrian ambassador would be in the office at 12.50 p.m. When the time came, I saw Haider, with Patrick Nixon, in the waiting room, and virtually read out a speaking note, ordering him and his staff out of the country by 7 November. Haider responded by saying that he had expected this, but assured me that he was totally innocent of any involvement. A very frosty and unpleasant interview, and I left it to Patrick Nixon to see the ambassador out. I learned later that Haider had made some pretty offensive personal comments about me to the press [recorded by Sherard Cowper-Coles in his 2012 book, Ever the Diplomat].

  Charles Powell called, mainly to discuss the PM’s Washington visit, because of which she has overturned Geoffrey Howe’s advice that we should vote for the Nicaraguan Resolution at the United Nations.

  29 OCTOBER 1986

  On my way to lunch with Greville Janner at Veeraswamy, I bumped into Michael Heseltine. Assuming that I was still in Saudi Arabia, he asked how the Tornado deal (which he had signed) was going. When I told him that I was now PUS, he exclaimed: ‘Good God! You’d better not be seen talking to me, then,’ – a reference to his walkout of Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet over the Westland affair. When I told Greville Janner this, he commented that it would surely do my career much more harm to be seen lunching with him!

  30 OCTOBER 1986

  I pulled Geoffrey Howe’s leg about a letter from the Financial Times, revealing to me that Geoffrey had given them a copy of a despatch from Belgrade, and suggesting that there should be a Howe award for the best official document of the year. In the light of the Craig despatch row, I told Geoffrey I would keep the letter, and use it in evidence against him, but wouldn’t put it in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the moment.

  1 NOVEMBER 1986

  My relations with Tim Eggar are slightly strained, since I had to draw his attention to the undesirability of including officials in party political discussions about electoral registration.

  4 NOVEMBER 1986

  Charles Denman reported to the office today on a fascinating talk with Zaki Yamani (who was sacked as Saudi oil minister last week), and who told Charles that two ministers had wished to issue a statement of solidarity with Syria over the Hindawi affair, but had been shouted down by their colleagues. Yamani himself said that he was 200 per cent in favour of what HMG had done, and congratulated us on having the guts that his own government lacked.

  6 NOVEMBER 1986

  Credentials for the new Romanian ambassador (under a changed name), who turns out to be the one Romanian at Harold Wilson’s lunch in Bucharest in 1975 who took his coat off in the summer heat, explaining to Ken Stowe that this was because he was the only Romanian at the table who was not carrying a gun.

  This afternoon, I attended a wreath-laying ceremony by Geoffrey Howe at the diplomatic service memorial in the main entrance hall. It is a sad coincidence that two of the three members of the service who were murdered by the IRA – Christopher Ewart-Biggs and Richard Sykes – were both pupils of my father at Wellington College. Both their names appear on a similar memorial in Wellington Chapel.

  10 NOVEMBER 1986

  Lynda Chalker called on me this afternoon to ask about Robin Renwick (whose help in European Community (EC) matters she is obviously terrified of losing) and about Pauline Neville-Jones.

  11 NOVEMBER 1986

  An early meeting with Geoffrey Howe, at which he complained about alleged inactivity by the office over Chirac’s extraordinary intervention in the Washington Times about Syria and hostages, accusing British Intelligence reporting of being garbage, and discussed Robert McFarlane’s arms deal with Iran. I defended the quality of reporting on both subjects from Paris and Washington, but agreed that more thought should be given to what we should say to both the Americans and the French.

  Geoffrey also complained about the briefing provided for the ministerial meeting on AIDS, pointing out that it urged ministers to reach early decisions, but gave no guidance on what those decisions should be. A fair point, though Geoffrey tends to whinge when he is uneasy about things. [I had already noted that the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), now under my former No. 10 colleague Ken Stowe, had made a surprisingly poor showing at Robert Armstrong’s preliminary briefing meeting.]

  12–16 NOVEMBER 1986

  My visit to Washington, which coincided, from 14 November, with the Prime Minister’s visit. Both visits were conducted against a backdrop of the arms for Iran scandal. At lunch with Mitch and Mary Ellen Reese on 15 November, Mary Ellen commented to me that the whole arms for Iran scandal could have come out of one of her own spy novels. When I called on Bob Gates at the CIA, I told him that I had hoped to call on Rear Admiral Poindexter, but that the meeting had been cancelled. Gates told me I was in good company, since both he and Bill Casey had been similarly put off.

  At a private dinner that evening in the embassy, Margaret Thatcher was in a good mood (except for one point, when she was reminded of the FCO building, on which she is slightly mad). She talked about her succession to the leadership, claiming (rather implausibly) that it was all a matter of chance, and that Keith Joseph would have had the leadership if he had wanted it.

  17 NOVEMBER 1986

  On my return, I called on Geoffrey Howe this evening to find him agonising over whether to try to insert himself into the PM’s visit to Moscow. I think he should; but quite understand that he does not want to court a rebuff. He is also worried about our relations with the Northern Ireland Office, and has asked me to try to get closer to Robert Andrew. I told him that I had so far been reluctant to add Northern Ireland to my ‘action portfolio’, but that I knew Robert Andrew well – we had been at Merton together – and would try. The problem is Tom King, who is absurdly sensitive about FCO responsibility for the Republic of Ireland. A day or so later, I discussed this with Nick Fenn, who is designated for the embassy in Dublin. We agreed that Tom King’s neurosis will not be improved by David Goodall’s responsibility for our relations with Ireland, given his history of masterminding the Anglo-Irish Agreement from the Cabinet Office.

  20 NOVEMBER 1986

  Gordon Manzie, the Chief Executive of the property services agency, and I discussed Margaret Thatcher’s hang-ups about the FCO and the ODA. He told me that he had attended a meeting at which Margaret Thatcher, with real hatred in her eyes, had virtually instructed him to charge the FCO to the hilt for our accommodation.

  The Prime Minister had been rather put out by a recent meeting with President Museveni of Uganda, who had reacted in a very off-hand way to her offer of a £10 million grant; she once commented that she liked to be thanked for our aid, and once firmly told Chris Patten and myself, when we called on her to discuss the aid programme, that on no account should we reduce aid for Kenya: ‘One thing about President Moi: he does know how to say thank you!’

  I lunched with David Watt, a leading political journalist, who was very critical of our decision to break relations with Syria. He contested my claim that it had been politically necessary, arguing (perhaps correctly) that it was just a question of what the Prime Minister wanted.

  21 NOVEMBER 1986

  I called on Tim Eggar to discuss the FCO’s relations with Parliament, on which he has a lot of ideas, some of which certainly breach the rules for civil servants; others will tread heavily on the toes of his ministerial colleagues. But several are quite sensible, and worth pursuing. But the rules are tightly drawn, and are personally endorsed by the Prime Minister.
r />   Michael Jenkins (minister in Washington) came to my morning meeting and described the Prime Minister’s talks at Camp David and the political situation over the arms for hostages deal with Iran, on which President Reagan lurches from bad to worse, though he has made it difficult to sack Poindexter by taking on full responsibility himself.

  Nicky Gordon Lennox (Madrid) told me today that the Spaniards are being increasingly difficult again about Gibraltar, partly because of obtuse and unimaginative officials in the Foreign Ministry. The Spanish ambassador in London has told Nicky that he now corresponds with his Foreign Minister via his home address.

  I called briefly on Bryan Hayes to discuss Alan Clark’s performance in Baghdad, where he failed to read his briefs, and spoke badly out of line about our arms policy towards Iran and Iraq. Bryan Hayes described him as a ‘curate’s egg’, and doubted whether it was necessary to send specific warnings to other heads of mission.

  But Clark is obviously an unguided missile – something that became abundantly clear during the Scott Inquiry, and after the publication of his diaries. As Minister for Trade, the DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) have been trying for a long time to get him to meet members of the British Overseas Trade Board. Having finally arranged it (by getting him to join one of their meetings), Bryan told me he kept them waiting for five minutes, and simply abandoned the meeting. He also, on his own initiative, kept the Moroccan Foreign Minister waiting ‘to teach him a lesson for King Hassan’s rudeness to the Queen’.

  [In a private exchange with William Waldegrave about his memoirs in 2015, I mentioned both Alan Clark and Ted Rowlands – the latter in the context of my instructions to rebuke Rowlands for leaking in Parliament our interception of Argentine naval codes during the Falklands War. William commented that Rowlands ‘was not really a bad man; Clark was’.]

  24 NOVEMBER 1986

  A call today by the French ambassador to lobby for the British vote on New Caledonia – singularly embarrassed, since the French are clearly going to vote against us on the Falklands Resolution this week. I enjoyed myself by pointing out that we were being lobbied to vote the other way by our friends in the South Pacific, who had supported us on the Falklands. I also saw the record of the Prime Minister’s talks in Paris, at which she had lambasted Chirac over the Falklands, saying that the French were prepared to throw other people’s Christians to the lions.

  25 NOVEMBER 1986

  Geoffrey Howe kept me back after a meeting on the Spycatcher case, to express some general worries about intelligence work, for which he is hankering after a ministerial group that would not include the Prime Minister; and his concern about Robert Armstrong’s excessive area of responsibility. He is also worried about the whole complex of American activities over arms sales to Iran (on which Poindexter resigned, and Oliver North was sacked, today). He has asked me, in a very Geoffrey Howe-like way, to arrange for a general review – though it is not quite clear of what!

  In a letter to the service dated 1 December, I included the following:

  Although, for understandable reasons, the Prime Minister in Washington affirmed her support for the President in ringing terms, the number of questions raised by the NSC’s foray into unconventional diplomacy, and by the President’s defence of it, is, if anything, growing. The whole incident has only increased the Secretary of State’s anxieties about the difficulties of formulating a consistent Western policy towards countries such as Iran, Libya, Syria and Nicaragua, where stated American policies do not always coincide with their covert intentions and activities. (It will also have reinforced his belief (not shared by the Prime Minister) that we may have, as he puts it, to leap from the American to the European trapeze sooner than we think.)

  I went to St Margaret’s Westminster for a service and reception of the World Council of Churches. As I was representing Geoffrey Howe, my enquiries about the seating arrangements obviously caused a flurry (and no doubt some acid comments about my self-importance); as a result, I was rather ostentatiously greeted at the service and at the later reception – courtesies made all the more embarrassing since the lesson was all about humility.

  26 NOVEMBER 1986

  Percy Cradock told me today that the Prime Minister had twice referred to the Peter Wright case in Australia as the ‘Patrick Wright case’. Charles Powell told me later that she had once thrown her entire private office into confusion by asking, as she left her office for Prime Minister’s Questions: ‘Is there anything new I should know about Patrick Wright?’ I also discussed with Percy – as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee – the supervision of intelligence, and Geoffrey Howe’s ideas for a ministerial group.

  28 NOVEMBER 1986

  A ministerial group has been formed, consisting of Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd and the Attorney General (Michael Havers) to handle the Spycatcher case; but Geoffrey feels strongly that the Attorney General won’t be up to it. It now emerges that, contrary to Robert Armstrong’s evidence, the Attorney General was never even consulted about Chapman Pincher’s book, and could well resign as a result.

  18 DECEMBER 1986

  After a gap, which included my attendance at the Commonwealth officials’ meeting in Bangladesh, I paid my first call on Chris Patten at the ODA, to be told on arrival by Crispin Tickell that John Caines’s appointment as his successor would be announced tomorrow. We had a very relaxed talk, during which Chris Patten commented on the very high standard of people in the diplomatic wing (and, to a lesser extent, in the aid wing) compared with elsewhere in the civil service. This applied particularly to the standard of briefing.

  19 DECEMBER 1986

  My last bilateral meeting with Geoffrey Howe before Christmas, at which I presented him with a sixtieth-birthday present – a copy of Victorian Ballads. I had also written him a personal note congratulating him on behalf of the whole diplomatic service. Sherard hinted strongly to me that not everyone in the office shared my enthusiasm for Geoffrey Howe, and was even doubtful whether I should send my note at all. It is, I’m afraid, true that Geoffrey is widely regarded as unnecessarily nit-picking and work-creating.

  Many years later, when we were both in the House of Lords, Geoffrey continued to send me occasional letters and articles, asking for my comments – as if I was still his PUS.

  1987

  5 JANUARY 1987

  I lunched at the Oxford and Cambridge Club, and walked back with Brian Cubbon, who is convinced that there will be a May or June election and that if, as everyone assumes, the government is returned, Geoffrey Howe will become Lord Chancellor and Douglas Hurd Foreign Secretary. He was not very complimentary about Douglas as Home Secretary, joking with me that, as a former diplomat, he did not seem to be committed to any principles. But I think he would be quite a good Foreign Secretary, though his influence with Margaret Thatcher would probably be as slender as Geoffrey Howe’s.

  Charles Powell tells me today that the PM is virtually certain to choose David Wilson for Hong Kong, and later confirms this in writing. When I told David, he was flabbergasted and overawed, but obviously very flattered. I consulted Tim Renton on which, if either, of us should go to Hong Kong to present the decision to EXCO (the Executive Council). Tim is obviously very nervous about the idea, which he thinks could turn into an embarrassing and public wrangle, with some trying to change ministers’ minds. David’s own preference is for me to do it, since in his view Tim Renton is not wholly popular with EXCO. I sent a telegram to Geoffrey Howe in Mexico, and have drafted a provisional telegram to consult David Akers-Jones on the best way to proceed.

  6 JANUARY 1987

  Tony Galsworthy telephoned me from Bermuda to say that Geoffrey had discussed the idea of a visit to Hong Kong with David Gillmore, and they were not in favour of the idea. David Akers-Jones later confirmed that he was also not in favour of it.

  7 JANUARY 1987

  I had a one-hour meeting with Gordievsky, which I found a fascinating experience, having been involved as DUS – one of the very few o
fficials to be briefed on his case – when he was still in the Soviet embassy in London. Indeed, I had the extremely awkward duty of trying to persuade Robert Flower – then deputy head of PUSD (the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department) with special responsibility for the Security Service, but unbriefed – that Gordievsky’s boss should be expelled (on pretty fragile grounds), so that Gordievsky could move up in the embassy hierarchy.

  [Geoffrey Howe explains in his memoirs that this was one of the few subjects on which he was briefed (by me) without his private secretary (Brian Fall) being present. Brian took a lot of persuading that I could talk to the Secretary of State without him being there to take a note, no doubt deeply suspicious that I wanted to talk about his own future.]

  I recall one meeting at 10 Downing Street when I was DUS for Defence and Intelligence. Margaret Thatcher – in a very rare breach of security – had referred to one of the Gordievsky reports, which no one else would have seen. I intervened to say that I was pretty certain that she was referring to a recent article in the New York Times; she took the hint!

  8 JANUARY 1987

  I discussed with Geoffrey Howe the PM’s forthcoming visit to Moscow, on which he told me to take a very firm line about his own attendance and participation, saying (quite reasonably) that he insisted on being there, at least when Shevardnadze is.