Behind Diplomatic Lines_Relations with Ministers Read online

  11 JULY 1986

  Charles Powell confirmed to me today that the Prime Minister is still adamantly opposed to Geoffrey Howe’s ideas on the Falklands. There is now a complicated scenario with the Ministry of Defence, which is very keen to get ministers to decide on force levels, and the need to impose a fisheries programme which Geoffrey is, rightly, reluctant to institute without a parallel diplomatic conciliatory move.

  I lunched with John Fieldhouse, and later stayed for a private talk covering the Falklands and Conventional Disarmament, on which the chiefs of staff have been outraged by Geoffrey Howe minuting George Younger on the latter without prior consultation at working level. I left for Ditchley at 4 p.m., having hurriedly minuted Geoffrey on the Falklands.

  14 JULY 1986

  An early drive to Chevening, for a session of talks between Geoffrey Howe and Eduard Shevardnadze, who arrived by helicopter at 9.15 a.m. Talks round the table in Geoffrey’s study upstairs were mainly on bilateral relations; chemical weapons; Southern Africa; and the Middle East. The time available was halved by interpretation, but it was quite a good dialogue, and Shevardnadze has a ready Georgian wit. Although not recorded at the time, I vividly remember that, in the midst of a discussion on disarmament, a white dove flew through the open window – it was a very hot day – circled the room, and flew out again. I think the Russians must have thought it was some devilish British trick!

  In the afternoon, I drove back to London for a brief spell on my in-tray before going to the rehearsal of the St Michael and St George service in St Paul’s. The rehearsal was unnecessarily long, and could have been done in twenty minutes, if properly organised. As secretary (ex officio) of the order, I had to parade directly in front of the chancellor’s page and banner (tickling my head, with the chancellor himself – Peter Carrington – muttering in a Carringtonian way about ‘all this ridiculous ceremonial’).

  Geoffrey Howe telephoned me last night to say he had decided not to push his Falklands ideas at the moment, but described the Prime Minister’s attitude to this question as ‘little short of manic’. There was a good profile in this week’s Observer, assuming (as most people do) that Geoffrey is, for the present at least, her potential successor, if she was to fall under the proverbial bus (on which The Observer quoted Peter Carrington’s remark: ‘No bus would dare’).

  15 JULY 1986

  I am told that Geoffrey really did come very close to resignation last night, presumably on the grounds that the Prime Minister was so far apart from him in her approach to South Africa. The press are becoming increasingly interested in (or inventing) a supposed constitutional crisis between the Prime Minister and the Queen.

  16 JULY 1986

  An early meeting on South Africa, on which Geoffrey is determined to try to produce a more conciliatory formula, and to get the Prime Minister to accept that we shall almost certainly – I think certainly – have to accept some measures against South Africa at the Commonwealth meeting in August. The Prime Minister is still holding out for no move, or hint of a move, before the Howe mission is over in three months’ time.

  Following the meeting, Geoffrey had quite a good session with the Prime Minister, which enabled him to make a positive statement in the House this afternoon. The important thing will be to ensure that the PM does not go back on it at Question Time tomorrow.

  Another case today of a senior diplomatic posting leaking, with David Goodall being congratulated by the Chief of General Staff on his posting to India before he knew about it himself – an echo of Norman Reddaway’s experience in the Beirut souk in the 1950s, when he was allegedly congratulated by some Lebanese on his posting as ambassador to Warsaw before the personnel department had notified him.

  Robert Armstrong called on me to air his worries about the Commonwealth meeting and a possible constitutional crisis, on which there had been some press speculation, though my impression was that the Palace was fairly relaxed on the subject, attributing worries in No. 10 more to Nigel Wicks than to the Prime Minister herself. Robert suggested that Christopher Mallaby (then on secondment to the Cabinet Office) should do some very private contingency planning with someone (perhaps Tony Reeve) in the FCO.

  In the evening, I dined at Lancaster House with the Exports Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) Advisory Council, sitting next to my host, Alan Clark, the Minister of State for Trade. When I told Geoffrey Howe, who I was dining with, he advised a long spoon. Clark told me that he had always been ‘infatuated’ with the Foreign Office, but that it had been a ‘frustrated love affair’. When he claimed that relations were bound to be bad between the two departments, and were deteriorating, I replied firmly that I had only recently agreed with Permanent Under-Secretary Bryan Hayes (who was present) that relations had never been better.

  [Many years later, Virginia asked me what I wanted for my birthday. When I said that I would like Alan Clark’s diaries, she replied that she was prepared to give me anything I wanted, but not them. We had both been extremely angry about Clark’s account of members of the diplomatic service, including his outrageous comment that one of his ambassadorial hostesses (admittedly anonymous, but nevertheless easily identified) proved that people with muscular dystrophy were always the most boring (or words to that effect).

  After I had joined the board of BP, I discussed Alan Clark’s diaries with John Baring (Lord Ashburton, the then chairman). John told me he had shared rooms with Alan Clark at Oxford, so knew him well. He commented that, from reading the diaries, you would think the Clarks were a rather grand family. ‘Actually,’ he added, ‘they were merely traders – like the Barings.’]

  17 JULY 1986

  The Commonwealth Games seem to be crumbling, with nine participants having fallen out so far. My attempt to get the PM to use some positive wording in the House of Commons today (and which could be used to encourage a positive decision from the Frontline States meeting in Harare tomorrow) failed, since Charles Powell took it on himself not to show Geoffrey Howe’s advice to the PM ‘on grounds of tact’.

  21 JULY 1986

  A call from Ramsay Melhuish (Harare) who is nervous, as a lot of high commissioners should be, that some Commonwealth governments may decide to break diplomatic relations with us over sanctions for South Africa. The walkout from the Commonwealth Games has now reached twenty-four countries.

  A meeting this afternoon in Robert Armstrong’s office on intelligence estimates, at which Peter Middleton (Treasury) infuriated us all by looking rather self-satisfied. In fact, he had little reason for self-satisfaction, since the Treasury’s attempts to cut back intelligence expenditure were invariably reversed by Margaret Thatcher, who was a strong defender of all three services [none of which, incidentally, was at this stage avowed].

  23 JULY 1986

  Geoffrey Howe told me today that he wanted me to be the ‘third man’ at the Commonwealth review meeting on South Africa in August. When I discussed this with Charles Powell, he said firmly that the PM had ‘decided’ that Robert Armstrong should do it (even though she is alleged to have said, after the Nassau meeting, that she did not want him to do it again).

  24 JULY 1986

  A brief (and rare) call from Jacques Viot, the French ambassador, asking to present a request for agrement for Luc de Nanteuil as his successor. A pity that Viot is going; he has gone down well in London. But French ambassadors in London have never, in my experience, regarded it as part of their duty to cultivate the FCO. I remember that when Michael Palliser was PUS, he once asked all the under-secretaries, at his morning meeting, which of them had received the French ambassador or even a senior official from the French embassy; virtually none of them had. This neglect was not, of course, helped by the general impression that Margaret Thatcher gave to all and sundry that the FCO was an object of contempt. Luc de Nanteuil (le vicomte) turned out to be an even less frequent visitor than his predecessors.

  25 JULY 1986

  Charles Powell told me today that (allegedly unknown to him and to Bernard
Ingham) the Prime Minister had given a private interview to the Sunday Telegraph, who were insisting – in spite of appeals both to the editor and the proprietors – on publishing the South African bits of the interview this Sunday. Charles claimed to be appalled; when I saw the text later, I agreed that it would be thoroughly unhelpful – and more worryingly, could be seen by Geoffrey Howe as another deliberate attempt to undermine him.

  28 JULY 1986

  I called on Timothy Raison at the ODA, who seems to be very conscious of morale problems in the FCO/ODA relationship. He asked me to try to get Geoffrey Howe to pay the ODA more attention. He also pointed out that the honours list regularly contains a long list of FCO awards, but very seldom any from the ODA.

  John Fawcett (Sofia designate) called today. He was later to end his mission with a highly eccentric valedictory despatch, calling for total disarmament. When Geoffrey Howe heard (from Fawcett on his farewell call) that the department had recommended against printing the despatch, he immediately suspected a bureaucratic cover-up, and asked to see the file copy. Having read it, he expressed total agreement with the decision not to print it.

  29 JULY 1986

  I held an early meeting to coordinate briefing for next week’s Commonwealth review meeting. The main brief will depend on Geoffrey Howe’s talk with the PM on his return from Southern Africa, and on Thursday’s Cabinet. As far as I can tell, most of the Cabinet accept that we have got to adopt, or at least to undertake to adopt, further measures against South Africa. The departmental ministers, such as Transport, are predictably opposed to measures which hurt their interests; but both the PM and Norman Tebbit are still fairly adamant against putting on any extra pressure.

  I attended the first half of Tim Renton’s meeting on Arab/Israel with Middle East heads of mission. Having for years thought we should upgrade our contacts with the PLO, I found myself arguing rather strongly that this would be a quite inappropriate and irrelevant time to do so. It would also cause great trouble with King Hussein and President Mubarak.

  Robert Armstrong tells me that the PM is not going to accept the move of the ODA to Richmond Terrace, and asked if Geoffrey Howe would drop the idea. I said that I thought it was an outrageous situation, and that the PM should be made to record her decision, the reasons for it, and the specific authorisation for the extra money involved from the Contingency Fund. The Public Accounts Committee could well have something to say about it.

  Geoffrey Howe had a bad meeting with the PM today. Ewen Fergusson told me it was quite clear that the prospect of meeting her had overshadowed the entire Africa visit. It has also become government by bully!

  In a letter, dated 30 July, to the service, I put it like this:

  The Prime Minister’s approach to the whole question of further sanctions or measures against South Africa has throughout been clear and consistent. She believes that sanctions are wrong and ineffective, and that they will serve only to damage our own interests as well as those of the blacks within South Africa and of South Africa’s neighbours. Her argumentation is flawless, but although the words of her pronouncements on this subject may in logic be right, the music has often been open to misinterpretation. The truth is that her statements, like those of President Reagan, have all too readily been seen in Africa and elsewhere as support for President Botha and apartheid. Her own conviction that she is right has made it all the more difficult for the Secretary of State to persuade her that we may have to be ready to move very quickly to some further measures if the pressures become too great. Failure to do so could result in real damage to our interests both in black Africa and more widely.

  31 JULY 1986

  After a Cabinet meeting which reached unanimous, if unsatisfactory, conclusions on further measures against South Africa, Bernard Ingham appears to have briefed the lobby that Geoffrey Howe had been isolated, and was considering resignation. Geoffrey told me this afternoon that he believed that Bernard was speaking without the PM’s authority.

  David Thomas called today to say goodbye on leaving the service. He is leaving early because his wife Susan (a Liberal candidate who later became a Liberal peer as Baroness Thomas of Walliswood) does not want to go abroad again. David himself told me he found the world such a disturbing place that he virtually wanted to ‘get off’. He also wondered whether the PM knew [I didn’t!] that the Assistant Under-Secretary dealing with Latin America for the past three years had been an Argentine subject, as well as the husband of a Liberal candidate. He said that when he had been in Moscow, there were more Argentines in the British embassy than in the Argentine embassy – an extraordinary illustration of the size and diaspora of the Anglo-Argentine community.

  1 AUGUST 1986

  The lead story in The Scotsman today – Mrs Thatcher is in Edinburgh – quotes a senior FCO source as denying that No. 10 had deliberately misled the press yesterday with the story of Geoffrey Howe’s resignation. Mrs Thatcher rang Charles Powell at 6 a.m., and was said to be ‘incandescent’. Tony Galsworthy told me that Geoffrey had been on the point of writing to the PM to say that either he or Bernard Ingham must go. He did eventually write two personal letters this evening: one, expressing his extreme displeasure over press handling; the other, urging the PM to adopt an emollient stance in her bilateral meetings and at the Commonwealth review meeting this weekend. Charles Powell later assured me that the PM was determined to adopt a calm and conciliatory approach ‘unless provoked’, at least in her bilateral meetings. Unfortunately, the PM is clearly looking forward to a row, and interprets recent opinion polls as showing that the electorate support a tough attitude towards sanctions and Southern Africa. She is probably right!

  2 AUGUST 1986

  Lunch at Wargrave Manor with Sultan Qaboos, for the PM and Denis Thatcher. Robert Alston (ambassador in Muscat), Tim Landon, the Omani ambassador and Charles Powell were also there.

  I had earlier considered with Tim Renton whether the PM should be briefed on the signals we were getting that the Sultan wanted to recover the embassy building in Muscat – in my experience, one of the most beautiful ambassadorial residences in the diplomatic estate – for his own purposes. I decided (mistakenly) not to brief her, on the grounds that the Sultan was most unlikely to raise the subject, and that Margaret Thatcher would be furious if she discovered that Geoffrey Howe had offered to hand it back (in exchange for a prime site on the coast, looking out over the Arabian Sea).

  As it was, in the middle of lunch, the PM fixed Robert Alston with one of her glares and said: ‘I hope Mr Alston is looking after that beautiful residence. We want to keep it for a long time.’ She turned her glare on me, and said: ‘Permanent Under-Secretary, you know my views about residences.’ I was extremely embarrassed, as I knew that the Sultan was under the impression that Geoffrey Howe had accepted the idea of an exchange. Robert Alston cleverly retrieved the immediate situation by assuring the Prime Minister that he was looking after the site, and that about eighty workmen had been working on it when he had left Muscat a few days earlier.

  3 AUGUST 1986

  After dictating several records from the Wargrave lunch, I went to Robert Armstrong’s office to hear Charles Powell’s description of the PM’s bilaterals with Mulroney, Gandhi and Kaunda. The first two had been surprisingly calm and good-tempered; the last was described as ‘fairly disagreeable’.

  At the review meeting itself, I spent most of the day waiting around at Marlborough House and doing a certain amount on my box. I arranged with my old Indian colleague from Damascus, Venkateswaran, to lunch with him tomorrow, since Gandhi had hinted fairly strongly to Tim Renton that our bilateral problems were better discussed without the involvement of their Foreign Minister. I suggested to Venkat that our lunch should be à deux, since his deputy, Daulat Singh, is virulently anti-British, and probably a major cause of our current difficulties.

  The review meeting broke up soon after 6 p.m., and I was asked to join a wash-up meeting in the PM’s study at No. 10. A standard performance by the PM of
either glaring at or ignoring Geoffrey Howe, whose patience must be wearing pretty thin. At one point, when she was being particularly rude to him, he simply picked up his red box and started doing signatures. This threw her for a moment; but then she quickly turned her fire on me!

  Alan Watkins in today’s Observer described Geoffrey as ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Challenger’, which won’t have helped him. She again started talking about partition as a solution to South Africa. I just hope she does not try this out as an idea at the review meeting. All her (and Denis’s) instincts are in favour of the South African Whites. She described today’s meeting as ‘worse than Nassau’.

  4 AUGUST 1986

  Much of today was spent hanging about in Marlborough House, waiting for reports on the meeting from Robert Armstrong and Geoffrey Howe. In spite of an apparent determination to play it cool, the PM started disastrously with an abrasive statement, saying that Britain was an independent state, and would not give aid to help the military struggle (though no one had suggested that we should).

  I gave lunch to Venkat, in view of Gandhi’s hint about avoiding ministerial discussion, though it has since occurred to me that it may have been designed to bypass Tim Eggar as much as the Indian Foreign Minister, Shiv Shankar, since Tim had an extremely rough meeting with the Indian High Commissioner two weeks ago. Venkat was very critical, both of Eggar and of our High Commissioner, Robert Wade-Gery, but agreed that Daulat Singh was not helpful, and claimed to have just blocked a long letter which Singh wanted to send.